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Taxpayers may reveal their assessment of policy through exercise of available voice and 
exit options within the fiscal constitution. The voice option is utilized when taxpayers 
remain within political boundaries and attempt to communicate their assessments regard­
ing the institutional status quo to policymakers. Exercise of the exit option occurs when 
taxpayers signal discontent with the status quo by purchasing from another government 
supplier. This paper discusses and contrasts the conventional and constitutional econom­
ics views toward fiscal design and argues that a major difference exists regarding the issue 
of who should be awarded primary responsibility in the policy process: taxpayers or 
policymakers? Because voice and exit options determine the relative leverage oftaxpay­
ers and policymakers in the policy process, it is argued that the design of voice and exit 
options in the fiscal constitution exerts a predictable influence on policy. The paper 
concludes that one's view toward the design of voice and exit options is affected by one's 
perception of the appropriate size of government. Competitive fiscal structures tend to 
be advocated by those who believe that government tends to overexpand and monopolistic 
structures tend to be advocated by those who believe that government tends to be too 
small. 
Introduction 
The design of fiscal structure is one of the most important issues in 
government supply. Two elements characterize fiscal structure: the 
initial intergovernmental arrangement and the mechanisms, if any, that 
may trigger changes in that arrangement over time. Fiscal structures 
may be designed with little or much choice in government supply. 
Government monopoly eliminates choice for taxpayers while intergov­
ernmental competition allows a degree ofchoice in supply for taxpayers. 
Taxpayers may reveal their assessment of government policy through 
exercise of "voice" and "exit" options (Hirschman 1970). The voice 
option is exercised when taxpayers remain within political boundaries 
and attempt to communicate their assessments regarding the status quo 
to policymakers. Exercise of the exit option occurs when taxpayers 
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signal discontent with the status quo by purchasing from another gov­
ernment supplier. 
The conventional literature on fiscal structure is interested in design­
ing efficient intergovernmental arrangements. Spending and taxing 
powers are divided among governments in the pursuit of allocative 
efficiency and various equity goals. As discussed by various scholars 
(Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Wiseman 1990), this literature is more 
interested in prescribing policy outcomes than analyzing the process 
by which individual taxpayers establish contracts with policymakers. 
Limited choice in government supply is often part of the fiscal design 
that promotes various policy outcomes (e.g., maximizing allocative 
efficiency). By limiting the ability of taxpayers to signal discontent 
through exercise of the exit option, the conventional view towards fiscal 
arrangements recommends that taxpayers be allowed only the voice 
option as the tool for producing an efficient social contract and public 
sector. However, in addition to providing policies that are directly 
demanded by taxpayers, removal of exit options allows policymakers 
to provide policies that are not directly demanded by taxpayers. 
Proponents of the constitutional economics view of fiscal constitu­
tions award greater leverage to individual taxpayers in the public policy 
process. In addition to voice options, greater choice through intergov­
ernmental competition enables taxpayers to use exit options to influence 
policy. The threat of exit also enhances the ability of taxpayers to 
effectively exercise voice options in the public policy process. 
This paper discusses and contrasts the conventional and constitu­
tional economics approaches toward designing efficient fiscal arrange­
ments within a simple model of the policy process. A major difference 
is their view regarding who should be given primary leverage in the 
policy process: taxpayers or policymakers? It is argued that the design 
of voice and exit options in the fiscal constitution exerts a predictable 
influence on policy outcomes. Design of voice and exit options deter­
mines the relative leverage of policymakers and taxpayers in the policy 
process and, over time, the abilities of taxpayers to change policies. 
As an example of a program designed as a monopoly of the federal 
government, the paper discusses the U.S. Social Security program. The 
paper concludes that policy prescriptions regarding the design of voice 
and exit options in fiscal structures are strongly affected by one's nor­
mative perception of the appropriate size of government. 
I. Simple Model of the Public Policy Process 
A simple model of the public policy process in a representative 
democracy is I 
taxpayer ~ policymaker ~ policy. 
Taxpayers signal preferences to policymakers who, in tum, enact pol­
icy. This ideal setting avoids many complexities that inform the design 
of a fiscal constitution. The following are perennial topics in policy 
analysis. What motivates policymakers? For example, if one assumes 
that policymakers are self-interested, then the various constraints on 
policymakers influence their ability to pursue their self-interests at the 
expense of taxpayers. How well do taxpayers reveal their preferences 
to policymakers? Even ifpolicymakers are not self-interested, inabilit­
ies of taxpayers to articulate preferences to policymakers may create 
differences between actual and desired policies. Moreover, even if 
taxpayers could perfectly articulate preferences, policymakers may not 
have the technical expertise to provide desired policy outcomes. 
This paper studies the general issue of how the design of voice and 
exit options in the fiscal constitution affects the public policy process. 
That is, how do different institutional settings influence the mix of 
power between taxpayers and policymakers in the policy process? For 
example, does elimination of the exit option influence the outcome of 
the interaction between taxpayers and policymakers? Does elimination 
of the exit option influence the abilities of taxpayers to successfully 
pursue their preferences in the policy process? We consider two models 
of the policy process: conventional and constitutional economics 
models. 
D. Conventional View of Efficient Fiscal Structures 
An underlying theme of the conventional view is that voluntary inter­
actions of private citizens within private markets fail to allocate 
resources efficiently. Public production is oftenjustified on the assump­
tion that private markets fail to optimally provide goods with properties 
of joint consumption and free-rider problems. Based on various effi­
ciency criteria, the different public policies are allocated to specific 
1 Assume citizens and taxpayers are identical and that organized pressure groups do 
not exist. 
levels of government (Oates 1972). Redistributive and stabilization 
activities are generally believed to be the province ofthe central govern­
ment (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989). Monopoly provision of redistri­
bution policies by central governments is often based on arguments that 
intergovernmental competition results in underproduction (Musgrave 
1959 and Oates 1972). Public goods and services that are mainly local 
in nature are allocated to noncentral governments. 
An implication of this view is that public markets improve the alloca­
tion of various resources and that taxpayers and policymakers should 
determine where resources are better allocated through the policy pro­
cess. Within our simple model ofthe policy process, taxpayer~ policy­
maker ~ policy, policymakers are assumed to be passive agents of 
the desires of taxpayers for a better allocation of resources. But it is 
important to realize that there are two different roles for policymakers 
in the policy process. One, taxpayers recognize that certain goods are 
characterized by nonrival consumption, nonexc1usion and free rider 
problems and that they need to be provided by the public sector. This 
communication may be signalled through exercise of the voice option 
of Hirschman's (1970) model and may be accomplished, for example, 
by taxpayers utilizing voting rights and writing letters to policymakers. 
In this case, policymakers are the passive agents of the articulated 
demands of taxpayers for specific public policies. 
Two, policymakers may believe that taxpayers do not adequately 
understand the extent to which private markets fail to produce certain 
goods.2 Policymakers may justify providing policies that are not directly 
demanded by taxpayers. Information on the appropriateness ofgovern­
ment policy is viewed, in the case of taxpayers, as an asymmetric 
resource in relatively short supply. Cases where taxpayers are observed 
attempting to avoid policies represent some of these justified policies 
that are not directly appreciated by taxpayers. To the extent that tax­
payers lack sufficient information about market failure, tax.payers will 
not be able to adequately communicate their policy preferences to 
policymakers. Thisjustification for government policy is awarded much 
discussion in conventional analysis of optimal fiscal structure and usu­
ally considers mobility of taxpayers as a problem that government 
2 See Littlechild and Wiseman (1986) for a discussion of three alternative frameworks 
(market failure, paternalist and libertarian) for the political economy of forcing taxpayers 
to accept government programs. 
monopoly overcomes.3 Pauly (1973) argues that redistribution policies 
ofnoncentral governments become self-defeating as long as citizens are 
mobile since, when one noncentral government raises its redistribution 
from the rich to the poor, the poor enter the jurisdiction as the rich 
leave. Because mobility thwarts the goals of redistributive policies, 
monopolistic provision is viewed as an appropriate device that restricts 
the adverse effects of mobility by taxpayers. Musgrave and Musgrave 
(1989: 459) argue: 
It follows that if policies aimed at adjusting the distribution of income 
among people are to be effective, they must be conducted primarily at the 
central or national level. By the same token, decentralization reduces 
the capacity to undertake redistributional policies. Implications for such 
policies are therefore a strategic factor in the centralization-versus-decen­
tralization issue. 
Revenue-sharing and intergovernmental grants are also devices 
which restrict abilities of taxpayers to thwart the goals ofpolicymakers. 
Both programs have the central government collecting taxes in excess 
of its spending and sharing the residual with noncentral governments. 
These programs are often proposed in cases of externalities (Ibid.). On 
a global level, Musgrave and Musgrave (1989: 455) argue that increasing 
internationalization of markets calls for international centralization of 
macroeconomic policies. Another rationale for monopolization is that 
larger government units exploit scale economies which serve to lower 
production costs. 
The recent proposal in Rivlin (1991) for the reform of the fiscal 
constitution demonstrates the conventional view. "Uniform shared 
taxes" are argued to be a solution to many problems (e.g., low savings 
rate and inadequate government production) in our economy. A pro­
gram of "uniform shared taxes" is argued to correct two problems: 
1) states are unable to raise sufficient taxes because ofinterstate govern­
ment competition and 2) states have unequal resources. 
The basic idea is that states, with or without the help of the federal 
government, share the proceeds of a common tax on a formula basis ... 
The group of states agreeing to share the tax could include all 50 or could 
be a smaller regional grouping ... For example, the federal government 
3 However, Buchanan's (1950) fiscal residuum theory demonstrates that even with 
identical redistribution programs, migration would still exist on the basis of income 
differentials across jurisdictions. 
could enact a 5 percent value-added tax, which would raise about $100 
billion a year, and distribute it directly to the states ... Ideally, the formula 
should be simple and should redistribute resources to some extent toward 
the poorer states (Rivlin 1991: 12). 
This argument implies that changing the fiscal constitution enhances 
the abilities ofpolicymakers to promote the public interest. Exit options 
are viewed as problems that a revised fiscal constitution should elimi­
nate by removing interstate tax-differentials. It is important to note that 
the appropriate impetus for changing the fiscal constitution is argued 
to be from policymakers, not taxpayers. That is, that taxpayers are 
responsive to interstate tax differentials is assumed to not reflect an 
appropriate impetus for changing the fiscal constitution in the direction 
oflowering the tax rates ofhigh tax states. Because ofbetter information 
on the appropriateness of policy, policymakers should be able to re­
design the fiscal constitution in ways that lessen the abilities of taxpay­
ers to flee additional policies. An implication of the conventional view 
is that government tends to be too small when numerous exit options 
are a characteristic of the fiscal constitution. 
Another implication of the conventional view is that the interests of 
taxpayers are not always served by choice in government supply. Rivlin 
(1991: 9) argues: 
... spending programs in which national uniformity is important to effec­
tive functioning belong on the federal docket. Air traffic control is one of 
these. So is social insurance. No one would want 50 different social 
security systems, each with its own rules for payment and eligibility. 
This view implies that policymakers make wise choices when designing 
programs such as Social Security and that fiscal constitutions should 
eliminate the abilities of taxpayers to utilize the exit option to thwart 
the provision of those programs. The implied logic is that elimination 
of choice in government supply eliminates the abilities of taxpayers to 
choose unwise programs and that, by awarding policymakers greater 
leverage in the policy process, social welfare is increased. The knowl­
edge that allows policymakers to supply wise programs is either a direct 
result of the communications of taxpayers to policymakers (through the 
voice option) or through the abilities of policymakers to determine and 
provide those policies that taxpayers do not understand that they need 
(and therefore would not be communicated through the voice option). 
In sum, the conventional analysis of efficiency in fiscal structure 
prescribes government monopolization as an appropriate correction for 
problems inherent in a world of taxpayer mobility and asymmetric 
information between taxpayers and policymakers. Removal of exit pos­
sibilities controls the abilities of citizens to thwart the beneficent aims 
of policymakers. Removal of exit options is not considered a problem 
for taxpayers because taxpayer-to-policymaker communication 
through exercise of the voice option is relatively perfect and any addi­
tional, and appropriate, policy that is not demanded by taxpayers will 
be provided by far-sighted policymakers. In order for the second policy 
category to be delivered to taxpayers, policymakers must remove or 
reduce exit options through restricting intergovernmental competition. 
III. Constitutional Economics View of Efficient Fiscal Structure 
A counter view of the public policy process, taxpayer~policymaker 
~ policy, is that it is difficult for taxpayers to not only convey useful 
communication to policymakers, but that self-interested policymakers 
may be inclined to further interests that differ from those of taxpayers. 
The models of logrolling, fiscal illusion, Leviathan, agenda control, 
rent-seeking and monopoly bureaus cast some doubt on the ability of 
taxpayers to communicate preferences through exercise of the voice 
option and receive policy which serves their best interests. This view 
of the policy process suggests the need to design fiscal constitutions 
that protect taxpayers from receiving and paying for policies which they 
do not desire. Because the voice option is viewed as an incomplete 
means of communicating the desires of taxpayers to policymakers, an 
important issue concerns how the design of the exit option influences 
the public policy process. A fundamental difference in analysis between 
the conventional and constitutional economics views is that the latter 
is more interested in studying the process by which individual taxpayers 
contract with policymakers rather than in prescribing final outcomes of 
policies. 
As Hirschman (1970) argues, exercise of the exit option is often a 
"last resort" in that, either because of loyalty to current suppliers or 
because of transactions costs, it is applied when customers believe 
they can not effectively communicate (through voice options) strong 
objections about the status quo. Seldon (1990: 106) argues that, in 
general, the voice option is not a constraint on suppliers when the ability 
to exercise the exit option is weak or nonexistent.4 In the case of 
government monopoly, lack of exit possibilities imposes a different 
constraint on the taxpayer-policymaker relationship than when exit 
possibilities pose a serious threat to policymakers that deliver policies 
contrary to the interests of taxpayers. The constitutional economics 
model does not assume that policymakers are benevolent or the passive 
agents of taxpayers and, even if they were, policymakers are not 
assumed to have any additional information on the appropriateness of 
policy outcomes beyond that of the individual taxpayer. Removal of 
exit options increases the leverage of policymakers in the taxpayer­
policymaker relationship and therefore enhances the abilities of policy­
makers to pursue their own interests. This model of the policy process 
recognizes the possibility that governments "fail" and that policymak­
ers may use fiscal structure, and monopoly power, to their advantage. 
If the ability of the voice option to produce appropriate policies is 
partially determined by the abilities of taxpayers to flee policies which 
they do not desire, then removal of exit possibilities lowers the effec­
tiveness of voice options and further reduces the leverage of taxpayers 
in the policy process. 
Wiseman (1990: 114) argues that analysis ofvoice and exit dimensions 
of a fiscal constitution is a means of appraising the efficiency of social 
arrangements, or the "responsiveness to the (subjective) value-systems 
of the individual members of a society ..." Few voice and exit options 
indicate a coercive fiscal constitution while many voice and exit options 
indicate an efficient social contract. This definition of an efficient social 
arrangement emphasizes the importance of the individual taxpayer and 
that, no matter what ex post policy outcome may emerge from a particu­
lar fiscal constitution, structures which coerce individual taxpayers are 
not efficient. An underlying theme of this view of the policy process is 
that fiscal constitutions should protect taxpayers from policymakers. 
In contrast, the above-discussed proposal for "uniform shared taxes" 
appears to rely on a methodology which protects policymakers from 
taxpayers and emphasizes policy outcomes within "the ends justify 
4 An interesting implication of this argument is that the ability of taxpayers to use the 
exit option may affect the exercise of the voice option by taxpayers. For example, one 
hypothesis may be that relatively monopolistic politicaljurisdictions experience relatively 
low voter turn-out rates. 
the means" rationale for designing fiscal constitutions which limit the 
choices of taxpayers. 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that exit options enhance the 
abilities of taxpayers to control the self-interests of policymakers.5 
With free trade and costless migration, explicit fiscal constraints on 
policymakers are argued to be unnecessary in a Tiebout (1956) world 
of competing governments. That is, existence of many exit options 
protects taxpayers from receiving policies which they do not desire. 
Policymakers who deliver policies that taxpayers do not desire either 
must start providing what taxpayers want or suffer an exodus of their 
taxpayers to competing governments. However, the availability of exit 
options only partially constrains the abilities of policymakers to pursue 
their self-interests when there exist mobility costs, large central govern­
ments and imperfect information. In this case, constitutional limits on 
government are argued to be effective alternative controls on policy­
makers. Since collusion potential falls with competition between suppli­
ers, intergovernmental competition is viewed as a desirable constraint 
on policymakers. 
From the constitutional economics model of the policy process, the 
inclusion of intergovernmental grants and revenue-sharing into fiscal 
constitutions is also questioned. Consistent with Tullock's (1969) rent­
seeking hypothesis, governments may be argued to seek collusive insti­
tutional arrangements that weaken competitive pressures, such as a 
system of grants where noncentral governments spend funds that they 
themselves do not collect. As grants remove competitive pressures 
between noncentral governments, grants also enhance the monopoly 
power of the central government in its tax collection effort. McKenzie 
and Staff (1978) and Lee (1985) view these activities as legal tax cartel 
arrangements. That conventional analysis predicts that benevolent gov­
ernments do not exploit such arrangements is evident from the above 
discussion of Rivlin's (1991) proposal for "uniform shared taxes." A 
prediction from the constitutional economics model is that, not only do 
governments exploit such arrangements, governments actively create 
such arrangements since they lower the abilities of taxpayers to utilize 
5 It may be more informative to say that it protects taxpayers from receiving policies 
which they do not desire. Whether or not some of these undesired policies are a product 
of public-spirited policymakers or a product of self-interested policymaking is a complex 
issue that will not be considered here. 
voice and exit options to prevent unpopular policies which policymak­
ers wish to deliver to them. 
Iv.. Central Government Monopoly: The Case of Social Security 
From a constitutionaleconomics viewpoint, the central government's 
monopoly in Social Security is predicted to eliminate intergovernmental 
competition and lead it to be administered at relatively high resource 
costs and low quality. Monopolization of Social Security also lowers 
the financial incentive of taxpayers to vote-with-their-feet on the basis 
of differential intergovernmental tax and spending policies. That is, 
monopolization ofSocial Security influences intergovernmental compe­
tition in two ways (Joulfaian and Marlow 1991). One way is to remove 
possibilities for competition within the area of Social Security. Here 
taxpayers can not gain, within a given country, by moving from one 
government to another since all locations offer identical Social Security 
tax burdens. Monopolization of this program removes the exit possibili­
ties for this policy. While noncentral governments, and private firms, 
also provide pensions, they are not competitors to the central govern­
ment monopoly since their provision is over-and-above that of Social 
Security. The recent growth ofprivate pensions, however, may indicate 
the degree to which the Social Security system is viewed as inadequate 
by taxpayers.6 If subjected to competing government, or private, pro­
viders, it is predicted that the current Social Security program would 
experience substantial exodus by taxpayers, or would become more 
efficient and attractive to participants. Without exit possibilities, tax­
payers must rely on their exercise of the voice option and the wisdom 
of policymakers to improve policy. 
The other way that monopolization of Social Security influences 
intergovernmental competition is through its influence on the competi­
tiveness of aggregate government. Monopolization of the Social Secu­
rity program not only eliminates intergovernmental competition within 
the Social Security program, but it also reduces intergovernmental 
6 For example, over 1970-1989, private pensions' share of total private financial assets 
has grown from 2% to 4%. Data obtained from table 794 in U.S. Bureau of the Census 
(1990). 
competition between all programs of central and noncentral govern­
ments. That is, monopolization of Social Security removes from compe­
tition a subset of total government activity. For example, the ratio of 
Social Security taxes-to-total government (federal + state + local) 
taxes has risen from .03 to .24 over 1950-1989 and suggests that Social 
Security policy has led to greater monopolization of the tax policies of 
all governments.7 The federal government monopoly in Social Security 
also commands mandatory participation ofvirtually every worker. The 
percentage of the civilian workforce covered under Social Security 
has grown substantially over time: 58.7% (1950), 79.4% (1960),83.7% 
(1970),90.2% (1980), 93.8% (1988).g The 1983 Amendments to the Social 
Security Act granted coverage to virtually every new-hire in the work­
force (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989: 195). 
One specific example of the growing monopolization of Social Secu­
rity is in the case ofstate and local government employees. For example, 
before 1951, state and local government employees were ineligible for 
participation in Social Security (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1987). 
Several important changes since 1951 have affected the ability of state 
and local governments to provide pensions to their employees. On 
January 1, 1983, state and local governments were no longer able to 
withdraw from the Federal program and effective April 1, 1986, the 
health portion of Social Security became mandatory for all new state 
and local government employees. 
Crain and Marlow (1990) argue that Social Security exerts a positive 
influence on the size of the federal government. When Congress passed 
the Social Security Act of 1935, it did not require the Social Security 
system to be fully-funded in the sense that it is not required to save, or 
put aside, funds for payment of future obligations. Rather, its pay-as­
you-go funding constraint only requires it to meet current operating 
expenses and benefits. Current benefits of retirees are financed by the 
current Social Security tax contributions of workers. While taxes in 
excess of current obligations may be invested in its trust funds, policy­
makers have the ability to use "excess" taxes to fund non-Social Secu­
rity programs. This is possible, in part, because Social Security tax 
revenues do not flow into its trust funds but, instead, in exchange for 
7 Data obtained from U.S. Bureau ofthe Census (1990). 
8 Data for 1950, 1960 and 1970 obtained from Kotlikoff and Smith (1983) and for 1980 
and 1988 from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990). 
IOUs to the trust funds, they flow like any other tax to the U.S. 
Treasury. To the extent that Social Security taxes are viewed as saved 
through the policy process, taxpayers may exhibit fiscal illusion 
whereby taxpayers underestimate the discounted value of future tax 
burdens.9 Crain and Marlow (1990) present evidence that policymakers 
use Social Security taxes to fund non-Social Security spending that lead 
to overall federal government expansion. 
It is useful to analyze the design of voice and exit options in the 
institutional structure of the Social Security program. While conven­
tional analysis of the policy process assumes that exercise of the voice 
option produces useful communication from taxpayers to policymakers, 
this may not be true in the case of Social Security. If, for example, 
taxpayers do not fully understand the unique financing characteristics 
of the program, then information they communicate to policymakers 
will be imperfect. With weak voice characteristics and without exit 
possibilities, implementation of appropriate policy requires that policy­
makers somehow provide it. Under the conventional model ofthe policy 
process, it is assumed that policymakers are up to the task, while the 
constitutional economics model suggests that appropriate policy may 
not be forthcoming. 
It is also useful to analyze the conventional proposition, as suggested 
in Rivlin (1991: 9), that "No one would want 50 different social security 
programs, each with its own rules for payment and eligibility." This 
proposition implies that the availability of choice in Social Security 
supply would somehow produce a worse program than when it is 
designed as a monopoly program of the federal government. Several 
problems with this proposition are evident. With elimination of exit 
options, what recourses are left for dissatisfied taxpayers in a world of 
imperfect voice options and self-interested policymakers? Another 
issue is whether or not elimination of the exit option reduces the proba­
bility that appropriate changes in policies are possible over time. If 
yes, removal of exit options violates the "responsiveness to the value 
systems of individuals" component in Wiseman's (1990) definition of 
efficiency in social arrangements. Another issue is: Why is Social Secu­
rity different from other financial instruments that are offered by private 
9 Barro (1974) discusses an alternative hypothesis, Ricardian Equivalence, which 
suggests that taxpayers can not be fooled into underestimating the true tax burdens 
associated with "complex" tax structures like Social Security. 
financial firms? For example, would it be preferable to have one monop­
oly bank so as to eliminate differences (and therefore taxpayer-choice 
as well) in banks (e.g., banking hours , asset-and liability- managements, 
number of branches, interest rate differentials, etc.)? 
The issue of whether or not Social Security should be designed as a 
welfare or income transfer system may dictate whether it is designed 
to operate on a fully-funded or pay-as-you-go basis and whether its 
design allows exit options. For example, exit options are inconsistent 
with a pay-as-you-go system, since that system is designed to redistrib­
ute income. 10 With exit options, retirees would tend to migrate to areas 
where Social Security tax revenues per retiree are highest and therefore 
undermine the ability of policymakers to redistribute income. In other 
words, policymakers who wish to redistribute income through the 
Social Security program would prefer that the program operate on a 
pay-as-you-go basis and recommend that its structure eliminate exit 
options. On the other hand, if policymakers wished to make the Social 
Security program a pension fund whereby government invested the 
savings of taxpayers in a fund that would be utilized at the time of 
their retirement, the program would be designed with a fully-funded 
operating constraint. Fifty different state systems would be viable under 
a contractually-grounded, fully-funded method of finance that vests 
funds with the contributors, but it would be inconsistent with mainte­
nance of pay-as-you-go systems that allowed exit options for contribu­
tors and beneficiaries.1I Without the goal of redistributing income, the 
availability of exit options would not tend to undermine the viability 
of fifty different and fully-funded state systems, but, rather, tend to 
strengthen the financial soundness of programs since they would now 
be subject to intergovernmental competition. 
Conclusion
 
One recommendation that follows from the conventional model of the
 
policy process is that constitutions should be designed with controls
 
10 See Browning and Browning (1987) for a discussion of these issues. 
11 Ifthe program is not designed to redistribute income, then the importance of having 
it publicly provided also diminishes since, like private savings accounts, they could be 
provided by the private sector. In this case, some policymakers may argue that public 
provision remains necessary because, without a public program, some subset oftaxpayers 
would not save for their retirement. Of course, critics of this view may argue that the 
current Social Security system does not do a better job of saving for taxpayers. While 
these issues are interesting, they are not the focus of this paper. 
on the abilities of taxpayers to flee benevolent government policies. 
Analysis using the constitutional economics model of the policy process 
raises the possibility that policymakers are not benevolent and that the 
interests of taxpayers are furthered by choice in government supply. 
Widened choice in supply is argued to enhance the communication 
characteristics of the voice and exit options within the policy process 
and lead to policies that better reflect the desires of taxpayers. 
Some fiscal constitutions, such as in the case of Social Security, are 
designed to eliminate choice in government supply. Analysis from the 
conventional viewpoint emphasizes the importance of policy outcomes 
and therefore recommends that fiscal constitutions be designed so as to 
discourage the ability of taxpayers to refuse policies that policymakers 
believe improve social welfare. Analysis within the constitutional eco­
nomics viewpoint emphasizes the importance ofdesigning fiscal consti­
tutions which do not coerce individual taxpayers and therefore recom­
mends that unlimited exit options be a characteristic ofthe constitution. 
That more centralized governments tend to be larger governments 
may explain the underlying motivation for the dichotomy in policy 
prescriptions regarding the design of the exit option. 12 Elimination of 
exit options may tend to be advocated by those who believe that the 
public sector tends to be too small. Monopolization through elimination 
of exit options allows policymakers to provide policies that mobile 
taxpayers would tend to flee. Monopolization under this normative 
assessment of government size appears to be a natural policy prescrip­
tion since, by lowering the ability of taxpayers to utilize voice and exit 
options within the policy process, monopolistic structures expand the 
abilities of policymakers to provide policies. 
Relatively competitive fiscal structures may tend to be advocated by 
those who believe that government tends to overexpand and therefore 
exit possibilities are considered to be desirable elements of the constitu­
tion since they enhance the abilities of taxpayers to reject policies that 
they do not want. Given the differences in perceptions ofthe appropriate 
size of government, it is not surprising that such diverse views exist on 
the design of efficient fiscal constitutions. The alternative models of the 
policy process indicate that the primary difference rests on who is 
believed to recognize appropriate policy: taxpayers or policymakers? 
12 See Marlow (1988) and Joulfaian and Marlow (I99I) for a discussion ofthe empirical 
evidence on the centralization-government size relationship. 
Proponents of the conventional model of the policy process prescribe 
that fiscal constitutions be designed with primary leverage awarded to 
policymakers while proponents of the constitutional economics model 
recommend that individual taxpayers be awarded primary leverage in 
the policy process. 
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